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Abstract
Recent research has shown a substantial active presence of bots in online so-
cial networks (OSNs). In this paper we utilise our past work on studying bots
(Stweeler) to comparatively analyse the usage and impact of bots and humans on
Twitter, one of the largest OSNs in the world. We collect a large-scale Twitter
dataset and define various metrics based on tweet metadata. We divide and fil-
ter the dataset in four popularity groups in terms of number of followers. Using
a human annotation task we assign ‘bot’ and ‘human’ ground-truth labels to the
dataset, and compare the annotations against an online bot detection tool for eval-
uation. We then ask a series of questions to discern important behavioural bot
and human characteristics using metrics within and among four popularity groups.
From the comparative analysis we draw important differences as well as surprising
similarities between the two entities, thus paving the way for reliable classifica-
tion of automated political infiltration, advertisement campaigns, and general bot
detection.
Index terms— information dissemination, social network analysis, bot characteri-
sation, behavioural analysis
1 Introduction
Bots (automated agents) exist in vast quantities in online social networks (OSNs). They
are created for a number of purposes, such as news, emergency communication, mar-
keting, link farming,1 political infiltration,2 spamming and spreading malicious con-
∗Email: szuhg2@cam.ac.uk; Corresponding author
1Link farming – http://bit.ly/2cXhfBv
2Bots distort U.S. presidential election – http://bit.ly/2l3VzGf
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tent. According to independent research, 51.8% of all Web traffic is generated by bots.3
Similarly, OSNs have seen a massive surge in their bot population; Twitter reported4
in 2014 that 13.5 million accounts (5% of the total user population back then) were
either fake or spam. The rise of bots on Twitter is further evidenced by a number of
studies [13, 17, 9, 6], and articles discussing bots.5
This constitutes a radial shift in the nature of content production, which has tradi-
tionally been the realm of human creativity (or at least intervention). Although there
have been past studies on bots (§2), we are particularly interested in exploring their
role in the wider social ecosystem, and how their behavioural characteristics differ
from humans. This is driven by many factors. The limited cognitive ability of bots
clearly plays a major role, however, it is also driven by their diverse range of purposes,
ranging from curating news to answering customer queries. This raises a number of
interesting questions regarding how these bots operate, interact and affect online con-
tent production: What are the typical behaviours of humans and bots, in terms of their
own activities as well as the reactions of others to them? What interactions between
humans and bots occur? How do bots affect the overall social activities? The under-
standing of these questions can have deep implications in many fields such as social
media analysis, systems engineering, etc.
To answer these questions, we have performed a large-scale measurement and anal-
ysis campaign on Twitter (§3).6 We focus on bots in Twitter because it largely exposes
public content, and past studies indicate a substantial presence of bots [5]. Address-
ing existing problems with automated bot detection algorithms, we utilise a human
annotation task to manually identify bots, providing us with a large ground-truth for
statistical analyses. We analyse the most descriptive features from the dataset, as out-
lined in a social capitalist study [8], including six which have not been used in the
past to study bots. Through our comprehensive approach, we offer a new and funda-
mental understanding of the characteristics of bots vs. humans, observing a number
of clear differences (§4). For example, we find that humans generate far more novel
content, while bots rely more on retweeting. We also observe less intuitive trends, such
as the propensity of bots to tweet more URLs, and upload bulkier media (e.g. images).
We also see divergent trends between different popularity groups (based on follower
counts), with, for example, popular celebrities utilising bot-like tools to manage their
fanbase.
We analyse the social interconnectedness of bots and humans to characterise how
they influence the wider Twittersphere. We observe that, although human contributions
are generally considered more important via typical metrics (e.g. number of likes,
retweets), bots still sustain significant influence. Our experiments confirm that the
removal of bots from Twitter could have serious ramifications for information dissemi-
nation and content production on the social network. Specifically, we simulate content
dissemination to find that bots are involved in 54.59% of all information flows (defined
as the transfer of information from one user to another user). As well as providing a
powerful underpinning for future bot detection methods, our work makes contributions
3Bot traffic report 2016 – http://bit.ly/2kzZ6Nn
4Twitter’s 2014 Q2 SEC – http://bit.ly/1kBx4M8
5Bots in press and blogs – http://bit.ly/2dBAIbB
6Datasets from this study will be made available upon notification.
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to the wider field of social content automation. Such understanding is critical for future
studies of social media, which are often skewed by the presence of bots.
2 Related Work
Two main streams of research are relevant to our work: (i) social, demographical and
behavioural analyses of either bots or humans; and (ii) the impact of bots in limited
social environments. Bot detection per se is not the focus of this paper. Many such
techniques are focussed on discerning anomalous from normal, spam from non-spam,
and fake from original, but they fail to distinguish (or compare) the types of users. Note
that a user can be a human and still be a spammer, and an account can be operated by
a bot and still be benign.
Social analysis of bots or humans. Most related to our work are behavioural stud-
ies of bots or humans. For example, [10] studied the infiltration strategies of social
bots on Twitter using a manual approach. They use three metrics to quantify the infil-
tration of social bots: followers, popularity score, and message-based interaction (other
users favouriting, retweeting, replying or mentioning the bot). They found that bots can
successfully evade Twitter defences (only 38 out of their 120 bots got suspended over
the course of 30 days). The authors also found that bots can successfully infiltrate
Twitter: 20% of the bots had more than a 100 followers. A similar work [3] studied
users’ behaviours in response to bot infiltration, calculating an infiltration success rate
of 80%. They concluded that a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches (to
expose more than publicly available data), and that the security defences of Facebook
are ineffective in detecting infiltration.
Unlike these works, we do not aim to monitor the success of bot infiltration. Rather
we are interested in understanding the behavioural differences of bots and humans.
That said, there is work that has inspected bot or human behaviour in isolation. For
example, [4] examined the retweet behaviour of people, focussing on how people tweet,
as well as why and what people retweet. The authors found that participants retweet
using different styles, and for diverse reasons (e.g. for others or for social action). This
is relevant to our own work, as we also study retweets. In contrast, we directly compare
retweet patterns of bots and humans (rather than just humans).
Thus, our work provides further insights on important differences and striking simi-
larities between bots and humans in terms of account lifetime, content creation, content
popularity, entity interaction, content consumption, account reciprocity, and content
dissemination. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to perform this methodi-
cal comparison of key metrics across these two types of Twitter accounts.
Social influence of bots. The above studies primarily inspect the characteristics
of bots. There has also been work inspecting the social influence of bots, i.e. how
other users react to them. In [2], the authors use a bot on aNobii, a social network-
ing site aimed at readers, to explore the trust, popularity and influence of bots. They
show that gaining popularity does not require individualistic user features or actions,
but rather simple social probing (i.e. bots following and sending messages to users
randomly). The authors also found that an account can circumvent trust if it is popu-
lar (since popularity translates into influence). In some cases their bot on aNobii was
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widely mistaken as a human and its activity triggered creation of groups and opinion
polarisation, thus raising concerns about privacy violations and evoking fear of being
controlled. The results, again, confirm that bots can have a profound effect on online
social media environments. Closely related is [16], which develops models to identify
users who are susceptible to social bots, i.e. likely to follow and interact with bots.
The authors use a dataset from the Social Bot Challenge 2011, and make a number of
interesting findings, e.g. that users who employ more negation words have a higher
susceptibility level. We take inspiration from this work and extend exploration to the
Twitter platform. However, instead of infiltrating a social network with “honeypot”
bot(s), we study the characteristics of existing bots. We argue that this provides far
broader vantage into real bot activities. Hence, unlike studies that focus on the influ-
ence of individual bots (e.g. the Syrian Civil War [1]), we gain perspective on the wider
spectrum of how bots and humans operate, and interact. Hence, we are not looking at
how bots influence individual topics [14].
3 Methodology
We use and build upon our past work Stweeler7 [12, 11] for data collection, pre-
processing, human annotation, and analysis. We define a ‘bot’ as any account that
consistently involves automation over the observed period, e.g. use of the Twitter API
or other third party tools, performing actions such as automated likes, tweets, retweets,
etc. Note that a tweet is an original status and not a retweet, a retweet is a tweet which
has ‘RT’ in text, and a status is either a tweet or a retweet. Also note that content on
Twitter is limited to whatever is contained within a tweet: text, URL, image, and video.
We will explore this further under content generation (§4.2), content popularity (§4.3),
and content consumption (§4.4).
3.1 Data Collection
We selected Twitter because it is open, large-scale and is known to contain a wide
breath of bot activities. We collect data on bot and human behaviour for 30 days in
April 2016 from the Streaming API. Note that every single action is recorded as a
tweet (status) on Twitter, whether a tweet, retweet, reply or mention. Since we collect
all the tweets within a time period T , we are certain we have comprehensive insights
within T . This resulted in approximately 65 million tweets, with approximately 2 to 2.5
million recorded per day. We then extracted the accounts and all associated metadata
(e.g. account age) from tweets. In total, we recorded information on 2.9 million unique
accounts. In this study, in addition to known metrics (age, tweets, retweets, favourites,
replies and mentions, URL count, follower-friend ratio, etc) we also analyse a set of
six novel metrics not explored in past bot research. These include: likes per tweet,
retweets per tweet, user replies and mentions, activity source count, type of activity
sources, and size of content uploaded. The selection of features is driven by [8] and, to
our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study to date.
7Stweeler– https://github.com/zafargilani/stcs
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3.2 Data Pre-Processing
Our data contains a range of accounts in terms of their popularity (i.e. number of
followers). During preliminary analysis we found that the purpose and activity of an
account differs based on its popularity. Hence, we partition profiles into four popularity
groups to enable a deeper understanding. These are as follows:
• G10M+– celebrity status: This is the subset of Twitter users with the highest
number of followers, i.e. >9M followers. These are the most popular users
that hold celebrity status (e.g. katyperry, BillGates) and are globally renowned
(e.g. CNN, NetGeo). Popular and credible organisations use these accounts for
various purposes, which makes them free of spam, thus having high credibility
and trustworthiness.
• G1M– very popular: This subset of Twitter users is amongst the most pop-
ular on the platform, i.e. 900K to 1.1M followers. These users are close to
celebrity status (e.g. jimcramer, BreeOlson) and global recognition (e.g. nyt-
food, pcgamer).
• G100k– mid-level recognition: This subset represents popular accounts with
mid-level recognition (e.g. AimeeSayah, DavidJohnsonUK, CBSPhilly, Do-
musWeb), i.e. 90k to 110k followers.
• G1k– lower popularity: This subset represents more ordinary users, i.e. 0.9k
to 1.1k followers. These users (e.g. hope bot, Taiwan Agent) form a large base
and, though they show lower individual and accumulated activity, they do form
the all-important tail of the distribution.
Our dataset is a representative sample of Twitter users, where each metric follows
Gaussian distribution. G10M+ and G1M are similar in their characteristics (cf. §4)
and constitute 0.65% of the total 105k accounts we partitioned in the dataset. G1k
represents the bulk of Twitter, constituting 94.40% of the total partitioned accounts.
G100k bridges the gap between the most popular and least popular groups, constituting
4.93% of the total partitioned accounts. A possibleG10k would be similar toG1k, and
a possibleG50k will be similar toG100k.
3.3 Bot Classification
To compare bots with humans, it is next necessary to identify which accounts are op-
erated by bots. We initially experimented with BotOrNot [7], a state-of-the-art bot
detection tool (to the best of our knowledge, this is the only available online tool).
However, inspection of the results indicated quite high levels of inaccuracy. Hence,
we chose to take a manual approach instead — we made this design choice to have
a smaller but more reliable set of classifications. We employed human participants to
perform a human annotation task8 to identify bots and humans. We note this could also
serve as a reliable ground-truth dataset to train classification algorithms for automated
bot detection in the future.
8Human annotation task – http://bit.ly/2cH0YvA
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Table 1: Summary of Twitter dataset post-annotation.
Group #Bot
accounts
#Human
accounts
#Bot
statuses
#Human
statuses
G10M+ 25 25 70713 77750
G1M 295 450 23447 25991
G100k 707 740 29777 21087
G1k 499 794 16112 5218
Total 1525 2010 140049 130046
We recruited four undergraduate students for the purposes of annotation, who clas-
sified the accounts over the period of a month. This was done using a tool that auto-
matically presents Twitter profiles, and allows the recruits to annotate the profile with a
classification (bot or human) and add any extra comments. Each account was reviewed
by all recruits, before being aggregated into a final judgement using a final collective
review (via discussion among recruits if needed).
As well as providing the recruits with the Twitter profile, we also presented sum-
mary data to streamline the task. This included: account creation date, average tweet
frequency, content posted on user Twitter page, account description, whether the user
replies to tweets, likes or favourites received and the follower-friend ratio. We also pro-
vide participants with a list of the ‘sources’ used by the account over the month, e.g.
Twitter app, browser, etc. The human workers consider both the number of sources
used, and the types of sources used. This is because sources can reveal traces of au-
tomation, e.g. use of the Twitter API. Additionally, the human worker would also visit
a user’s Twitter page and verify the content and URLs posted. Overall, we presented
participants with randomised lists that fell into the four popularity groups containing
2500 accounts each. Human annotators were instructed to filter out any account that
matched the following criteria: account that does not exhibit activity (i.e. no tweet,
retweet, reply, and mention), or account that is suspended. In total, the volunteers suc-
cessfully annotated 3535 accounts. Out of the successfully annotated accounts, 1525
were classified as bots and 2010 as humans. At the time of writing all of the accounts
in our dataset were active. Table 1 provides a summary of the data.
For context, we can cross validate by comparing the agreement of final annota-
tions by the human workers to the BotOrNot annotation. The average inter-annotator
agreement compares the pairs of labels by each human annotator to capture the per-
centage of accounts for which all four annotators unanimously agree. The average
agreement is measured as a percentage of agreement, where 0% shows lack of agree-
ment and 100% shows perfect agreement. Our human annotation task shows very high
unanimous agreement between human annotators for each popularity group: G10M+
(96.00%),G1M (86.32%),G100k (80.66%), andG1k (93.35%). Whereas, BotOrNot
shows lower than average agreement with the final labels assigned by the human an-
notators: G10M+ (46.00%), G1M (58.58%), G100k (42.98%), and G1k (44.00%).
Since, BotOrNot yields a lower accuracy, we restricted ourselves to the dataset of ac-
counts that were manually annotated.
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4 Which manners maketh the Bot?
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Figure 1: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) between bots and humans per
measured metric. The figure shows none (0.0) to weak correlation (0.35) across all
metrics, indicating clear distinction between the two entities.
The purpose of this study is to discover the key account characteristics that are
typical (or atypical) of bots and humans. To explore this, we use our data (§3) to em-
pirically characterise bots (dashed lines in figures) and humans (solid lines in figures).
To begin, we simply compute the correlation between each feature for bots and hu-
mans; Figure 1 presents the results as a heatmap (where perfect correlation is 1.0). It
can be immediately seen that most features exhibit very poor correlations (0.0 to 0.35),
indicating significant discrepancies between bot and human behaviour — we therefore
spend the remainder of this paper exploring these differences in depth.
4.1 Account Age
First, we ask how recently have bots started to participate on Twitter? To answer this
we use account age, which captures the length of time an account has been in operation.
Figure 2 presents the age of each account, separated into their respective groups (bots
vs. humans of varying popularities). Unsurprisingly, it can be seen that there is a
clear correlation between the age of an account and the number of followers. More
noteworthy is the fact that counterpart human accounts are actually slightly ‘younger’
in age than the bot accounts, especially for G10M+. The oldest bot account is 3437
days old vs. 3429 days for the oldest human account – bots are clearly not a new
phenomenon. Labels provided by human annotators suggest that these long-standing
popular bot accounts have been operated by large reputable organisations as a means of
reaching out to their fanbase, viewers and customers, e.g. CNN, BBCWorld, NatGeo.
In particular, they are interested in spreading news, content, products and services, and
are, thus, a very effective tool for these purposes. This further confirms that the Twitter
7
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Figure 2: Age of user account in days.
API incentivises the creation and existence of bots on its platform, as highlighted in
§1. In fact, the age of some bot accounts suggest that they have long supported the
evolution and uptake of Twitter.
4.2 Content Generation
Next, we ask if bots generate more content on Twitter than humans? Intuitively, one
might imagine bots to be capable of generating more content, however, creativity is a
clear bottleneck. We initially consider two forms of content creation: a tweet, which
is an original status written by the account, and a retweet, which is repetition of an
existing status. When using the term status, we are referring to the sum of both tweets
and retweets. First, we inspect the amount of content shared by computing the number
of statuses (i.e. tweets + retweets) generated by each account across the 30 days. As
anticipated, humans post statuses less frequently than bots (monthly average of 192 for
humans vs. 303 for bots), in all popularity groups except G10M+, where surprisingly
humans post slightly more than bots. The sheer bulk of statuses generated byG10M+
(on average 2852 for bots, 3161 for humans in a month) is likely to acquire popularity
and new followers. Overall, bots constitute 51.85% of all statuses in our dataset, even
though they are only 43.14% of the accounts.
An obvious follow-up is what do accounts tweet? This is particularly pertinent as
bots are often reputed to lack original content. To explore this, we inspect the number
of tweets vs. retweets performed by each account. Recall, that a tweet is an original
status and not a retweet. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) present the empirical distributions of
tweets and retweets, respectively, over the 30 days. We see that the retweet distribution
is rather different to tweets. Bots in G1M, G100k and G1k are far more aggressive
in their retweeting; on average, bots generate 2.20× more retweets than humans. The
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only exception to this trend is G10M+ where humans retweet 1.54× more often than
bots. This is likely driven by the large number of tweets generated by celebrity users
— clearly, when tweeting over a hundred times a day, it becomes necessary to rely
more heavily on retweeting. That said, typically, humans do generate new tweets more
often, while bots rely more heavily on retweeting existing content. Generally, humans
post 18 tweets for every retweet, whereas bots post 13 tweets for every retweet in all
popularity groups exceptG10M+ (where both entities show similar trends).
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(a) Number of tweets issued by a user.
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(b) Number of retweets issued by a user.
Figure 3: Content Creation: Tweets issued, Retweets issued.
Whereas tweets and retweets do not require one-to-one interaction, a further type of
messaging on Twitter, via replies, does require one-to-one interaction. These are tweets
that are created in response to a prior tweet (using the @ notation). Figure 4 presents
the distribution of the number of replies issued by each account. We anticipate that bots
post more replies and mentions given their automated capacity to do so. ForG10M+,
bots post only marginally more, on average, than celebrities. This appears to be due
to two reasons: bots in G10M+ deploy chatbots for addressing simple user queries,
and need-based human intervention to engage with followers. From the perspective of
celebrities, replies serve the need (or desirability) to interact with their fanbase. For
the most popular automated accounts it is the need to promote direct interaction for a
larger user base. Bots in the remaining popularity groups respond twice as frequently
as their human counterparts. Again, this seems to be driven by the ease by which bots
can automatically generate replies: only the most dedicated human users can compete.
Finally, we briefly inspect the actual content of the tweets being generated by the
accounts. We do this using two metrics: number of URLs posted by accounts, and
the size of media (e.g. pictures) uploaded. Figure 5(a) presents the scatter plot of the
number of URLs (y-axis) and content uploaded in KB (x-axis). Bots place far more
external URLs in their tweets than humans (see Table 2): 162% in G10M+, 206%
more inG1M, 333% more in G100k, and 485% more in G1k. It has been previously
noted that a higher number of external URLs suggests automation [5]. Bots are a clear
driving force for generating traffic to third party sites, and upload far more content
on Twitter than humans. Figure 5(b) presents the distribution of the amount of con-
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Figure 4: Content Creation: Number of replies and mentions posted by a user.
tent uploaded by accounts (e.g. images). This is extracted by finding matches for
*.twimg.* keyword in the [entities] [media] [media url] tweet attribute.
Note that *.twimg.* is a generic domain name for Twitter CDN9. Account popu-
larity has a major impact on this metric. Bots inG10M+ have a 102× lead over bots in
other popularity groups. That said, humans inG10M+ have a 366× lead over humans
in other popularity groups. We conjecture that celebrities have a lot more to share from
their lives, but also use uploading as a means to stay connected with their fanbase.
Overall, bots upload substantially more bytes than humans do (see Table 2): 141% in
G10M+, 975% more in G1M, 376% more in G100k, and 328% more in G1k. It is
worth noting that both content upload and URL inclusion trends are quite similar, sug-
gesting that both are used with the same intention, i.e. spreading content. Since bots in
G10M+ mostly belong to news media – sharing news headlines is clearly a means of
operating their business.
4.3 Content Popularity
The previous section has explored the amount of content generated by accounts, how-
ever, this does not preclude such content from being of a low quality. To investigate
this, we compute standard popularity metrics for each user group.
First, we inspect the number of favourites or likes received for tweets generated by
the accounts. This is a reasonable proxy for tweet quality. Figure 6(a) presents the
empirical distribution of the number of favourites or likes received for all the tweets
generated by the profiles in each group. A significant discrepancy can be observed.
Humans receive far more favourites per tweet than bots across all popularity groups
9What is twimg? – http://bit.ly/2mCnSL0
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Figure 5: Content Creation: URLs in tweets, Content uploaded on Twitter.
except G1k. Close inspection by human annotators revealed that bots in G1k are
typically part of larger social botnets that try to promote each other systematically for
purposes as outlined in §1, whereas human accounts are limited to their social peers
and do not usually indulge in the ‘influence’ race. For G10M+, G1M and G100k
popularity groups, humans receive an average of 27×, 3× and 2× more favourites
per tweet than bots, respectively. G1k bots are an exception that receive 1.5× more
favourites per tweet than humans. This is a clear sign that the term popularity may
not be ideally defined by the number of followers. According to the human annotators,
this is due to a number of reasons including: humans posting personal news, engaging
with their followers, posting less often than bots, staying relevant, posting for their fans
(personal things from their life), and not aiming to redirect traffic to external websites.
Bots on the other hand, post much more often and do not engage with followers, likely
reducing the chances of their tweets being liked.
A further sign of content quality is another user retweeting content. This is po-
tentially an even stronger signal of endorsement, as a retweet will explicitly be listed
on a user’s wall. Humans consistently receive more retweets for all popularity groups
G10M+: 24-to-1, G1M and G100k: 2-to-1, except G1k: 1-to-1. This difference,
shown in Figure 6(b), is indicative of the fanbase loyalty, which is vastly higher for in-
dividual celebrities than reputable organisations. In other words, the quality of human
content appears to be much higher. We can then inspect who performs the retweets, i.e.
do bots tend to retweets other bots or humans? We find that bots retweeting other bots
is over 3× greater than bots retweeting humans. Similarly, humans retweeting other
humans is over 2× greater than humans retweeting bots. Overall, bots are retweeted
1.5×more than humans. This indicates a form of homophily and assortativity. To visu-
alise this, Figure 7(a) presents a graph of interactions for the 10M accounts; nodes are
the accounts, whilst edges represent a direct interaction i.e. retweeted statuses, quoted
statuses, replies, and mentions. The above observations of homophily can immediately
be seen with bots and humans forming distinct groups. To further confirm this, Figure
7(b) shows the status of interactions if bots are removed from the bot-human interac-
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tions (Figure 7(a)). Although interactions are still substantial, they are notably less
when bots are excluded. This indicates that, where popularity does exist, it tends to be
driven by assortative account types, e.g. popular bot accounts are given that status via
other bots.
100 101 102 103 104
likes-per-tweet
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CD
F
Bot-10M
Human-10M
Bot-1M
Human-1M
Bot-100K
Human-100K
Bot-1K
Human-1K
(a) Likes per tweet received by a user.
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Figure 6: Content Popularity: Likes per tweet, Retweets per tweet.
(a) Interaction graph for G10M+. Black dots are
accounts, edges are interactions. Red edges are bots;
Blue edges are humans.
(b) G10M+ Humans only (Bots removed).
Figure 7: Content Popularity: Interaction graphs for Bots vs. Humans.
4.4 Content Consumption
Whereas the previous metrics have been based on content produced by the accounts
under-study, our dataset also includes the consumption preferences of the accounts
themselves. Hence, we ask how often do bots ‘favourite’ content from other users
and how do they compare to humans? Intuitively, bots would be able to perform far
12
more likes than humans (who are physically constrained). Figure 8(a) shows empirical
distribution of the number of likes performed by each account. It can be seen that,
actually, for most popularity groups (G1M, G100k, G1k), humans favourite tweets
more often than bots (on average 8251 for humans vs. 5445 for bots across the entire
account lifetimes). Linking into the previous discussion, it therefore seems that bots
rely more heavily on retweeting to interact with content. In some cases, the difference is
significant; for example, G1M and G100k see, on average, 2× more likes by humans
compared to bots. G10M+, however, breaks this trend with an average of 1816 by
humans compared to 2921 by bots.
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Figure 8: Content Consumption: Likes performed, Favouriting behaviour.
We conjecture that there are several reasons for this trend. First, humans have a
tendency to appreciate what they like and therefore marking a like is a manifestation
of that tendency. In contrast, many bots are simply trying to promote their own tweets
and therefore their interactions are based less on likes. We also posit that humans have
an incentive to like other tweets, potentially as a social practice (with friends) or in
the hope of receiving likes in return [15]. Bots, on the other hand, are less discerning,
and feel fewer social obligations. To explore these strategies further, Figure 8(b) plots
the number of favourites performed by an account vs. the age of the account. It can
be seen that more recent (i.e. more modern) bots are significantly more aggressive
in liking other tweets. Older bots, instead, use this feature less frequently; manual
inspection suggests this is driven by the trustworthy nature of older bots, which are
largely run by major organisations. In contrast, younger bots adhere less to good social
practice and clearly attempt to use favouriting to garner a lot of attention.
4.5 Account Reciprocity
As well as content popularity, we can also measure reciprocity (i.e. friendship). In
Twitter, this is classified as a reciprocal follower-relationship (i.e. when two accounts
follow each other). This is in contrast to a non-reciprocal relationship, whereby an
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account has many followers who are not followed in return (this is often the case for
celebrities). We ask do bots show reciprocity similar to humans? We measure this
via the Follower-Friend Ratio. Figure 9 shows empirical distribution of the Follower-
Friend Ratio for each group of accounts. The results show that humans display higher
levels of friendship (G10M+: 4.4×, G1M andG100k: 1.33×, G1k: 15×) and thus a
lower Follower-Friend Ratio than bots.
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Figure 9: Friend-follower ratio of a user.
Previous research [5] argues that humans typically have a ratio close to 1, however,
our analysis contradicts this assumption. For celebrities, very popular and mid-level
recognition accounts this ratio is in the order of thousands-to-1, irrespective of whether
an account is a bot or a human (G10M+: 629011-to-1 for bots vs. 144612-to-1 for
humans,G1M: 33062-to-1 for bots vs. 24623-to-1 for humans,G100k: 2906-to-1 for
bots vs. 2328-to-1 for humans). In fact, even the ratios for low popularity accounts
are not 1, but consistently greater (G1k: 30-to-1 for bots vs. 2-to-1 for humans). This
is caused by a human propensity to follow celebrity accounts (who do not follow in
return), as well as the propensity of bots to indiscriminately follow large numbers of
other accounts (largely in the hope of being followed in return).
4.6 Tweet Generation Sources
Finally, we inspect the tools used by bots and humans to interact with the Twitter
service. This is possible because each tweet is tagged with the source that generated
it; this might be the website, app or tools that employ the Twitter API. Figure 10(a)
presents the number of sources used by human and bot accounts of varying popularities.
Surprisingly, it can be seen that bots actually inject tweets using more sources than
humans (cf. Table 2). This is unexpected as one might expect bots to use a single
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source (i.e. an API or their own automated tool). However, paid third party services
exist that can be utilised for the automation purpose.
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To explore this further, Figure 10(b) presents the number of accounts that use each
source observed. It can be seen that bots use a multitude of third-party tools. Bot news
services (especially from G10M+) are found to be the heaviest users of social me-
dia automation management and scheduling services (SocialFlow, Hootsuite, Sprinklr,
Spredfast), as well as a Cloud-based service that helps live video editing and sharing
(SnappyTV). Some simpler bots (from G100k and G1k groups) use basic automation
services (Dlvr.it, Twittbot), as well as services that post tweets by detecting activity on
other platforms (IFTTT). We also detected use of social media marketing and branding
services (ICGroupInc, IFTTT, Spredfast) by users (especially organisations operating
user accounts via automated agents) in all popularity groups. A social media dashboard
management tool seems to be popular across most groups exceptG1k(TweetDeck). In-
terestingly, it can also be seen that bot accounts regularly tweet using the Web/mobile
clients — it seems likely that these accounts have a mix of automated and human oper-
ation. In contrast, 91.77% of humans rely exclusively on the Web/mobile clients. That
said, a small number (3.67%) also use a popular social media dashboard management
tool (TweetDeck), and automation and scheduling services (Buffer, Sprinklr). This is
particularly the case for celebrities, who likely use the tools to maintain high activity
and follower interaction — this helps explain the capacity of celebrities to so regularly
reply to fans (§4.2). These things should be noted when using the tweet sources to
identify bots.
5 Discussion, Conclusions & Future Work
Bots exercise a profound impact on Twitter, as this paper thoroughly investigates. Table
2 summarises key differences between bots and humans. For each popularity group the
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Table 2: Feature inclination: B is more indicative of bots, whereasH is more indicative
of human behaviour, and© is neutral (i.e. both exhibit similar behaviour). * represents
magnitude of inclination: * is considerable difference, ** is large difference. signif.
shows statistical significance of each feature as measured by t-test.
Feature & value Fig. 10M+ 1M 100K 1K signif.
Older age of account in days 2 B © © ©
More user tweets 3(a) © B* B* B*
Higher user retweets 3(b) H* B∗ B∗ B∗ 99%
More user replies and mentions 4 © B* B* B 99%
More URLs in tweets 5(a) B** B** B** B** 99%
More CDN content (KByte) up-
loaded
5(b) B** B** B** B** 95%
Higher likes received per tweet 6(a) H** H** H** B 99%
Higher retweets received per
tweet
6(b) H** H** H** B 99%
More tweets favourited (liked) 8(a) B** H** H** H** 99%
Higher follower-friend ratio 9 B** B* B* B**
More activity sources 10(a) B* B B B 99%
table shows which feature most suitably distinguishes which entity, i.e. bot (B) or
human (H). The magnitude of differences is represented by * (considerable) and **
(large). Table 2 also includes statistical significance (signif.) of the mean difference
between humans and bots across all popularity groups, as measured by the t-test: at
99% confidence level (extremely different), and 95% (very different).
The t-test is generally used to determine if two sets of data (bots and humans in
this case) for each feature are significantly different from one another. This confirms a
number of noteworthy behavioural differences between bots and humans in this char-
acterisation study. For example, confirming past work, we observe a significant and
longstanding bot presence on Twitter (§4.1). We show that bot users in G1M tweet
more often than humans in the same category. However, there are a small number of
features for which humans and bots are more similar, particularly in G10M+, where
we find humans often exhibit bot-like activity (e.g. tweeting a lot).
That said, overall, we find that bot accounts generate larger amounts of tweets
than their human counterparts, whilst they (proportionally) rely far more heavily on
retweeting existing content and redirecting users to external websites via URLs (§4.2).
These trends appear to be driven by their difficulty in creating novel material when
compared to humans. Despite the voluminous amount of tweets contributed by bots,
we find that they still fail to beat humans in terms of quality though, e.g. humans receive
a mean of 19× and a median of 41×more likes per tweet than bots across all popularity
groups (§4.3). The divergence between retweet rates is even greater. Humans receive a
mean of 10× and a median of 33× more retweets per tweet than bots.
Regardless of their reputed sophistication, it seems that bots still fail to impress
users when viewed through the lens of these metrics. Bots also seem to spend less time
liking others’ tweets (§4.4); in other words, humans see greater value in showing their
appreciation of other content and users. This trend is mirrored in other metrics too, e.g.
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humans tend to have a higher proportion of reciprocal relationships (friendships) than
bots (§4.5). When combined, we believe that these propensities are heavily influenced
by a form of social obligation that bots clearly do not feel. The lack of such considera-
tions may lead to dramatic changes in social structures and interactions in the longterm
(as the bot population increases).
It was also particularly interesting to note the similarities between celebrity users
and bots; we even found that some celebrities use bot-like tools (§4.6). Finally, we
found the two user groups exhibit homophily both in terms of one-hop interactions and
wider communities. For example, bots retweeting other bots is over 3× more regular
than bots retweeting humans, whereas humans retweeting other humans is over 2×
greater (§4.3).
There is a series of interesting and open questions that need to be explored and an-
swered in our future work. A major line of future work is expanding the size of our data
to understand how bots impact information dissemination more widely. Currently, we
only focus on the accounts that actively disseminate content (i.e. tweets or retweets).
It would be worthwhile to also inspect less active bots and humans, e.g. fewer than 1K
followers. Moreover, we wish to go beyond bot vs. human studies to understand the
purpose of the (bot) accounts, e.g. news disseminators, socio-political infiltrators or ac-
tivists, marketing bots, spam and malicious content propagators, etc. We also noticed
a non-negligible amount of bots that create original content [10]. Thus, it would be
interesting to further explore the content creation process and perform topical analysis,
i.e. how and what material do bots tweet, and which approaches gain most traction. It
would be interesting to further explore the content creation process and perform top-
ical analysis, i.e. how and what material do bots tweet and which approaches gain
most traction, especially for bots that create original content. Finally, our investiga-
tions have revealed inaccuracies in existing bot detection algorithms (hence our use of
manual classification). Manual approaches, however, reduce the ability to study very
large number of accounts. Thus, utilising our findings to fine-tune an automated but
reliable bot detection tool is a major remaining challenge. These topics are reserved as
our future research, and plan to extend our measurement platform accordingly to help
us seek answers.
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